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POINT I 
RESPONDING TO THE STATES POINT I, THIS COURT SHOULD 
DECIDE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
PROPERLY INSTRUCT REGARDING THE PROPER MENS REA FOR 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
The State takes the position that, because the defendant briefed a case, State 
v. O'Bannon, 2012 UT App. 71, 274 P.3d 992, which does not directly address the 
crime of aggravated assault, that this Comi should simply avoid, ignore, and 
abstain from addressing the issues raised by State v. O'Bannon in relation to the 
charge of aggravated assault. Br. St. 25 - 26, 29 - 35. It argues that since the 
defendant makes no explicit argument that O'Bannon directly overrules prior case 
law, this Court should not consider it. Br. St. 29 - 30. 
The State is incorrect in that regard. The O 'Bannon case was decided very 
near the start of trial, but it had not been reported yet. The Comi of Appeals ruled 
that at least in physical child abuse cases, a person must intend, not just to engage 
in the conduct, but intend to produce a particular result. It is the defendant's 
position that that rubric should be applied to the facts of this case with respect to 
the aggravated assault. This Court held that the State's argument and authorities 
failed to suppmi the sort of "eggshell plaintiff' doctrine, as is applicable in tort 
law, in a criminal case. 0 'Bannon, ~ 3 8. It held to be en-oneous the instruction 
that the injurer takes his victim as he finds him regardless of his intent to cause a 
certain amount of harm: " ... the State had the burden of proving that O'Bannon 
1 
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intended his conduct to cause the victim serious physical injury or of proving that 
O'Bannon knew that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the victim serious 
physical injury." Id., ~ 23. The Court held this to be inconsistent with philosophy 
of the criminal code, which " .. .include "[f]orbidding and prevent[ing] the 
commission of offenses" and "[d]efining adequately the conduct and mental state 
which constitute each offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from 
condemnation as criminal. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104(1)-(2)." Id., ~ 30; Br. 
Aplt. 28 - 29. 
The State is entirely accurate that authorities hold that "the mental state 
required for assault is "'intent, knowledge, or recklessness."' Br. St. 30. That 
however does not negate the validity of the defendant's argument that instruction 
3 8 (R.921) is effoneous, prejudicing the defendant in failing to require the jury to 
find that he acted with intent, or knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the 
result of his conduct, i.e., that he intended, knew, or was reckless with respect to 
the use of deadly force in causing the alleged victim serious bodily injury. The 
absence of language to that effect justified affesting judgment or granting his 
motion for new trial on the facts of this case. 
The defendant does not disagree with the authority cited by the State, State 
v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1976), State v. McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328, 328-29 
(Utah 1978); State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981) insofar as they go. However 
2 
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even the State concedes that where a second degree felony aggravated assault is 
charged under Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 5 - 103 (1) (a), specific intent is required. 
See Br. St. 32-33, citing State v. Mangum, 2013 UT App 292, 318 P.3d 250 (per 
curiam). Inasmuch as Mangum was convicted under the section for using a 
dangerous weapon, the defendant contends that the statements in the Mangum case 
regarding the section under which the defendant was convicted must be considered 
to be non-binding dicta. 
0 'Bannon considered the case law and affirmed the defendant's position in 
this case. 
(State v.)Gonzales (2002 UT App 256, 56 P.3d 969) and (State v.) 
Hamblin (676 P.2d 376 (Utah 1983) do not support the application of 
the eggshell plaintiff doctrine in a criminal case. We agree that 
Gonzales and Hamblin are instructive in that these cases recognize a 
basis under Utah law for holding a defendant culpable for causing 
death even when other factors contributed to the victim's death. See 
generally Hamblin, 676 P.2d at 379; Gonzales, ilil 20-21. In this case, 
however, Instruction No. 9A is not comparable to those issued in 
Gonzales and Hamblin. Instruction No. 9A advised the jury that it 
could find O'Bannon guilty of a specific result-based offense without 
determining that he had the requisite intent or knowledge that his 
conduct would cause that result. Thus, Instruction No. 9A improperly 
allowed the jury to find O'Bannon guilty without the required proof 
that he intentionally or knowingly caused the victim's serious physical 
injuries. In this case, however, Instruction No. 9A is not comparable 
to those issued in Gonzales and Hamblin. Instruction No. 9A advised 
the jury that it could find O'Bannon guilty of a specific result-based 
offense without detennining that he had the requisite intent or 
knowledge that his conduct would cause that result. Thus, Instruction 
No. 9A improperly allowed the jury to find 0 1Bannon guilty without 
the required proof that he intentionally or knowingly caused the 
victim's serious physical injuries. 
3 
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O'Bannon, 274 P.3d at i1 38. The defendant's contention is that this language is 
directly applicable to the instant matter. 
The State is likewise incorrect in its assertion that the defendant can show no 
prejudice. See Br. St. 34-35. It should be remembered that it was the alleged 
victim who initiated the fight when she lunged out of her chair and hit the 
defendant in the eye. R.1129:85. She herself testified that she bit the defendant on 
the finger. R.1128:109. When she bit his finger and would not let go, R.1129:91, 
the defendant acted reasonably in self-defense, and the only reason he hit her head 
against the book shelf was to get her to release her bite. R.1129:92-94. 
Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed that, to convict him of 
third degree aggravated assault, it had to find not only that he acted intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly with regard to his conduct, but that he "intended, knew, or 
was reckless with respect to whether the force he used was deadly force, likely to 
cause serious bodily injury" and that "his desire" was "that [Janet] suffer bodily 
injury." Thus it was en-or to merely instruct the jury under a standard of 
recklessness in using "other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury." Instruction 38 (R.921); see Br. Aplt. p. 26 - 27. More was required 
under the circumstances of this case. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REDUCE THE 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION. 
The defendant's conviction for aggravated assault should have been reduced 
to a class A misdemeanor. The defendant fully set forth his position in Point II of 
his opening brief. Defendant's argues there that no meaningful distinction exists or 
existed at the time between an act that is intended or likely to cause serious bodily 
injury, but results only in substantial bodily injury, and an act that may have been 
intended to cause serious bodily injury but results only in substantial bodily injury. 
In either case the result is the same. Consequently, where such inherent ambiguity 
exists within the statutory framework, as it does here, there is good reason to apply 
the Shondel doctrine [State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969)] 
doctrine and, the defendant contends, thereby reduce his conviction to a class A 
misdemeanor. See Br. Aplt., Point II, passim. 
For a like reason, the defendant's position is that the rule of lenity applies, 
the rule of lenity being "[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a com1, in construing 
an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, 
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment," State v. 
Graham, 2011 UT App. 332, ~ 16 , 263 P.3d 569 citing Black's Law Dictionary 
1449 (9th ed. 2009). 
5 
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If, as the defendant contends, the statutory scheme is ambiguous, the 
defendant should have been entitled to both the benefit of the Shondel doctrine and 
the rule of lenity. His conviction therefore should have been reduced to a class A 
misdemeanor. As the defendant's position is set forth at length in his opening 
brief, further exposition of his position is unnecessary. See Br. Aplt. p. 31-38. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S 
ARGUMENT THAT THE AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING ACQUITTAL IS 
IRRECONCILABLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT CONVICTION, wmcH IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT 
REQUIRES REVERSAL AND REMAND. 
The Defendant's claim is that the jury verdict of aggravated assault is 
irreconcilable and fatally inconsistent with the jury's acquittal of the aggravated 
kidnapping even though the victim testified as to all of the elements of that charge, 
including that Defendant had used a dangerous weapon and that he had acted with 
the intent to inflict bodily injury on or terrorize her. See Br. Aplt., p. 38-39. 
The State cites no Utah authority for its assertion essentially that inconsistent 
verdicts have no meaning. Br. St. p. 51 -52. It cites sister states and the United 
States Supreme Court for the proposition that "compromise" verdicts, and verdicts 
where the jury may have weighed the evidence differently, simply portend that the 
jury weighed the evidence for each count from a different perspective, or applied 
6 
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lenity, or were simply mistaken. Id. citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 
64-65 (1984 ). 
The problem in the case at bar is that the jury verdicts are irreconcilably 
inconsistent. See United States v. Powell, at 469 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1984). If the 
verdicts are irreconcilable, as they are here, the case must be reversed and 
remanded. If verdicts are both inconsistent and irreconcilable the jury's verdicts 
must be overturned and the case remanded for appropriate action in light of the 
circumstances. Holbrook v. Master Prat. Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 299-300 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) citing Alzado v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 752 P.2d 544, 554 (Colo. 
1988). 
In attempting to reconcile the inconsistent verdicts in this case, as was 
argued in defendant's opening brief, this Comi would have to completely ignore 
instruction number 34, R. 922. With respect to the elements of aggravated 
kidnapping, instruction number 34 instructed that in order to convict, the jury must 
find Mr. Salt guilty of detaining or restraining Janet Guinn against her will. Such 
detention and restraint is a fact to which she testified in detail, unequivocally, and 
without any particular disagreement in the defendant's testimony. Br. Aplt. p. 38-
40. She testified that in the process of attempting to leave, he grabbed her head 
and gave her two sharp twists and told her he could not let her leave (R.1128: 106); 
she was on the ground on her back and he was holding her down (R.1128:110); 
7 
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and that she told him this was "stupid" and to let her go, and he said "no" that he 
could not let her go because she had ruined everything (R.1128:113). Id. In the 
course of that detention, she further testified that he either possessed, used, or 
threatened to use a dangerous weapon, a piece of pottery he used to hit her on the 
head (R.1128:110); he struck her in the forehead with a lead pipe, causing bleeding 
(R.1128: 114-116); he said he had a gun, Rl 128: 119; he injured her sufficiently to 
cause her to go in and out of consciousness and she received stitches and 65 staples 
to her head, R1128:131,200-04, and that he acted with the intent to inflict bodily 
injury or teITorize her (which must have consisted of the aforementioned incidents 
involved in the milieu of their struggle). The defendant was acquitted of this count 
of aggravated kidnapping. R.939. Aggravated kidnapping is defined in salient part 
as follows: 
( 1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the 
course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping:(a) possesses, 
uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 7 6-
1-601. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302. According to the alleged victim's testimony the 
defendant threatened or used a dangerous weapon. Such an acquittal 1s 
consequently entirely inconsistent and irreconcilable with a conviction of 
aggravated assault. 
On the other hand, the offense of aggravated assault, as set forth in 
instruction 38, required the jury to find as elements 4 and 5 that Mr. Salt 
8 
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committed an act with unlawful force or violence that caused bodily injury to Janet 
Guinn or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to Janet Guinn and that he did 
so by using a dangerous weapon or other means of force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. R.926. 
Mr. Salt contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, but also 
that it is irreconcilably inconsistent for the jury to have acquitted him of the 
aggravated kidnapping, but convict him of the aggravated assault. This is 
demonstrated by the verdict, of using, possessing, or threatening the use of a 
dangerous weapon and of having the intent to inflict bodily injury or ten-orize Ms. 
Guinn. The absence of such evidence serves at the same time to negate the 
element of aggravated assault, namely that he used a dangerous weapon and that he 
acted with the goal of causing her bodily injury. Mr. Salt contends that lack of 
proof of these elements rendered irreconcilable the acquittal of aggravated 
kidnapping with the conviction for aggravated assault, requiring that the court 
grant judgment of acquittal or a new trial. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE 
DEFINITION OF "COHABITANT" IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The defendant has thoroughly briefed this issue in its opening brief. See Br. 
Aplt. Point IV. The State contends that Defendant's overbreadth challenge fails 
because the challenged definition does not reach any constitutionally protected 
9 
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conduct. Defendant's vagueness challenge fails because, when considered in light 
of the statute's purpose, the statute as a whole, and relevant case law, the 
challenged definition gives adequate notice to ordinary people concerning what 
behavior is covered. Br. St. p. 55. 
It seems obvious that where the cohabitation statute references language 
which brings within its embrace a party who "resides or has resided in the same 
residency as the other party,"§ 78B-7-102(2) (West Supp. 2008); id.§ 77-36-1(1) 
( defining "cohabitant" as having "same meaning as in Section 78B-7-102"), that 
the party is engaged in the s01t of "intimate human relationship" referred to in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), cited by the State. Br. St. 
p. 58. "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships 
must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such 
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our 
constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as 
a fundamental element of personal liberty." Id. 468 U.S. 617-18. This is precisely 
the sort of proscription against intrusion which invalidates the definitional section 
of the cohabitant abuse statue wherein it refers to "resides or has resided in the 
same residency as the other party." § 78B-7-102(2), supra. As the United States 
Supreme Court recognized in Roberts, 
(B)ecause the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it 
must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly 
10 
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personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from 
unjustified interference by the State. Without precisely identifying 
every consideration that may underlie this type of constitutional 
protection, we have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have 
played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by 
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby 
foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and 
the power of the State. Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded 
such relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much 
of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting 
these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore 
safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is 
central to any concept of liberty. 
The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that 
therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships that 
might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those 
that attend the creation and sustenance of a family -- marriage; the 
raising and education of children; and cohabitation with one's 
relatives. Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep 
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals 
with whom one shares not only a special cmmnunity of thoughts, 
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's 
life. Among other things, therefore, they are distinguished by such 
attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in 
decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from 
ethers in critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, only 
relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the 
considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of 
association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty. Conversely, an 
association lacking these qualities -- such as a large business 
enterprise -- seems remote from the concerns giving rise to this 
constitutional protection. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly 
imposes constraints on the State's power to control the selection of 
one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the choice 
of one's fellow employees. 
Id, 468 U.S. 618-20 (Emphasis added; internal citations omitted). 
11 
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The "resides or resided together" language of the cohabitant abuse statute is 
of the very essence of the s01t of personal affiliations that exemplify considerations 
which secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of 
certain kinds of highly personal relationships from which the First Amendment 
secures "a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the 
State." Id. 618. Consequently, it is unconstitutional in its overbreadth because 
"(1) the statute 'reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct' 
even if the statute also has a legitimate application" and "(2) the statute is not 
'readily subject to a narrowing construction."' Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 
2004 UT 14, 110, 86 P.3d 735(citations omitted); Br. St. p. 58. 
This principle has nothing to do with the perpetration of "violent crime," as 
the State asserts. Br. St. p. 59-60. It has to do with the right of individuals to 
associate under the First Amendment, as reflected in Roberts. The fact that at 
some distant time, an act of violence occurs between paities who have resided 
together at one point hardly vitiates the basic principle that two persons may freely 
associate without fear that that association will be subject to reprisal by the State 
for some act between them at an unrelated later time. 
Regarding the issue of unconstitutional vagueness, it could not be more 
evident that the statute provides the opportunity for the State to engage in arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement. See Br. Aplt. p. 40-45. As this Court has stated, 
12 
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A statute can be "unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to the 
facts of a given case." When asserting an as-applied challenge, the 
party claims that, under the facts of his particular case, "the statute 
was applied ... in an unconstitutional manner." Id. In contrast, "when 
asserting a facial challenge, a party seeks to vindicate not only his 
own rights, but those of others who may be adversely impacted by the 
statute in question." In making a facial challenge, the challenger 
asserts that the statute is so constitutionally flawed that 111no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid."' 
State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ,r 27, 100 P.3d 231, 239 (internal citations 
omitted), cited by the State, Br. St. 56, 61, 65. The defendant has discussed the 
facial versus "no set of circumstances" issues and standards in his opening brief 
and will not repeat it here. Br. Aplt. p. 40-45. Suffice it to say that the definitions 
of the cohabitant abuse statute are sufficiently vague and indefinite both on their 
face and in application as to render the cohabitant abuse statute unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad. Neither on the face of the statute, nor as it is applied to the 
defendant, nothing gives a reasonable understanding to the defendant or any 
ordinary person that his contemplated conduct or association is proscribed. 
More to the point of the issue, the statute should be facially invalidated as 
overbroad because it inhibits the exercise of First Amendment freedom of 
association rights where the impermissible applications of the law are substantial 
"judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." City of Chicago v. 
Morales, 527 U.S . 41 , 52, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1857, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1999). 
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POINTV 
FAILING TO REQUEST AN ADDITIONAL ELEMENT ALLOWING THE JURY 
TO CONSIDER MS. GUINN'S PRIOR ASSAULT AND ACT OF VIOLENCE 
TOWARD THE DEFENDANT IN THE SELF-DEFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION 
AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The State asserts that since the self-defense jury instruction in this case 
infonned the jury that the factors there were "non-exclusive," its failure to 
specifically include the alleged victim's acts of prior violence toward the defendant 
as a factor did not preclude the jury from considering the prior violence toward 
him in determining the reasonableness of his conduct. Consequently, the State 
argues, the defendant cannot show either that counsel's decision not to challenge 
the instruction constituted deficient performance or that he was prejudiced by 
counsel's decision. Br. St. 65-66. This fails to attach the importance that the prior 
violent acts deserve to the defendant's justifiable acts of self-defense. 
The State points to other instructions given the jury which focused on the 
State's burden of proof. Br. St. p. 67-68. But it fails to recognize, as was pointed 
out by the defendant in his opening brief, that the particular factor which counsel 
failed to include in Instruction 21, was a very key and critical element. "By failing 
to request a very crucial element of self-defense, defense counsel allowed the State 
a free pass in its burden to prove the defendant guilty. It has been held that when 
obvious defenses are ignored in lieu of those which are ostensibly weaker, the 
presumption of effective assistance of counsel may be overcome. See, e.g., Gray 
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v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (C.A.7 1986). Br. Aplt. p. 48. One cannot merely say 
that since the State bears the heavy burden of proof, and the defendant no burden, 
that leaving out a critical guidepost for the jury to consider is harmless error, where 
self-defense is the defendant's entire defense. Omitting the crucial element of 
prior violence was a failure of substantial proportion. It is very likely that the jury, 
because it was not informed of this critical factor, did not consider it. 
The State makes much of the fact that other factors, which might not have 
been helpful to the defendant, were also omitted. Br. St. p. 69. How this argument 
is helpful to the analysis of this issue is not explained. The fact of the matter is, 
counsel failed to include a key statutory element which the jury could and should 
have considered, i.e., the alleged victim's prior violence. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-402. The alleged victim's prior assaultive behavior was essential to 
establishing self-defense, and counsel's failure to request this element was both 
negligent and prejudicial. This was conduct which fell below the standard of 
practice required of defense counsel, failed to bring to bear the skill and expertise 
required of counsel, and was therefore deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). As has been amply set fo11h in the defendant's opening 
brief, it was highly prejudicial. Br. Aplt. p 46-49. 
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The reasonable likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high to undennine 
confidence in the verdict. See State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, 1 23, 248 P.3d 
984. In this regard, it should be borne in mind precisely what the standard is: 
(T)houghtful reflection suggests that confidence in the outcome may 
be undermined at some point substantially short of the "more probable 
than not" portion of the spectrum. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,920 (Utah 1987). The likelihood of a different result 
was far short of "more probable than not" in this particular case. Counsel's error 
created a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict and require reversal and a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the defendant respectfully requests that this 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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